Displacement in Compartments of Solidarity. Part 2

You are listening to Radio Unheard

A podcast for cultural professionals, where we explore the ethical dilemmas around the intersection of art and politics.

I'm your host, Asia Tsisar, and in this season, we're going to drown together in the Question of Solidarity.

Intro (Asia Tsisar): In the first part of this episode [1], thanks to sharp observations by Ukrainian social anthropologist Ruslana Koziienko, we reviewed how the current structures of the protection system tend to compartmentalize people with the experience of displacement, and how those legal devices and narratives around it prevent people from solidarizing with each other.

In the second part, Dr. Zeynep Şahin Mencütek helps us to place this problem in a broader context and examine the general trends of the erosion of protection for displaced people worldwide, and how the rise of right-wing powers exploits the subject of migration, not only in the EU, but globally.

Zeynep Şahin Mencütek: My name is Zeynep Şahin Mencütek. I have a PhD in politics and international relations. I'm a senior researcher and a doctor here in Germany. My institution is the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies [2].

Currently, I am coordinating a Horizon Europe project [3] about return migration, and I have been working on migration governance, refugee studies, diaspora, and similar topics, mainly from the sociological and political perspective.

Asia Tsisar: Can you tell us the history of the Temporary Protection [4] system, how it was developed, and what were the main reasons why it was developed?

Zeynep Şahin Mencütek: Yeah, Temporary Protection [5] has been in implementation for a while in practice and de facto, but its legal codification is mainly done with the EU directive in 2001.

But actually, it was used before in several formats, both for the Vietnamese refugees in South Asia, for example in the US context, and also it was used during the Yugoslav Wars to protect Bosnians in Europe in the early 1990s, Kosovars in the late 1990s, and also in several other countries in different formats, specifically in those countries that are not signatories of the Refugee Convention [6].

When we look at the content of Temporary Protection, it is an emergency measure to provide immediate protection, specifically in the events of mass influx towards people who are unable to return. The protection statutes give people necessary protection.

And it’s also protecting the asylum system, which would be under pressure if it tried to process all of these applications. First of all, it is responding to practical needs of the countries that encounter mass influx, which is not a rare case.

Often, refugee movements happen in a very short time period and also in very massive numbers, in which the countries cannot really respond in an orderly manner. Temporary Protection is helping with this humanitarian aspect.

The second thing is more about the legal part: the protection gaps. And the 1951 Convention has not fully addressed the protection needs of all people because it has very specific measures.

But at the same time, in this case, there is still a risk that people will be sent to countries where they will face the risk of persecution, torture, or human rights violations. These protection gaps can be addressed by Temporary Protection.

And the last thing is state responsibilities. The states are responsible to protect even though they are not part of the Refugee Convention. And they have this protection responsibility due to their signature to other international conventions like the Convention Against Torture or the Human Rights Convention. Temporary Protection also allows the states to fulfill these responsibilities.

Asia Tsisar: Do I understand correctly that it was developed in the EU and then adopted in countries like Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and so on? Or am I mistaking something?

Zeynep Şahin Mencütek: I think I should correct, that I didn't mean that these countries adapted to the EU directive. These countries were already using de facto protection mechanisms, although they don't call this Temporary Protection. But when you look at their asylum system, you are going to see that they are adopting a Temporary Protection very similar to what the EU is doing.

These countries are not EU member states and they may not approve the Directive, but in countries like Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, India, and many South Asian countries — we see that it is de facto in usage. I mean that in practice they use such things, but they don't call it Temporary Protection Directive.

Also, let me add that many countries are not signatories of the Refugee Convention. For instance, in the Middle East region, only Iran, Israel, Egypt, and Yemen are parties to the Convention, while many other states like Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan, also most states like Pakistan and Iran, who have a large number of refugees or mass influxes, they are not parties to the Refugee Convention. But they have their own asylum mechanisms and protection mechanisms, which include Temporary Protection.

Asia Tsisar: Do you have an answer for why in 2015 [7] the Temporary Protection Directive wasn't activated?

05:35] Zeynep Şahin Mencütek: Yeah, it is a difficult question because we are not in those rooms where the EU decide about which directives or which types of policies they would put into practice, but there are some analyses that we can recall.

First of all, I agree with many scholars that the EU should have adopted the Temporary Protection Directive in responding to the 2015 refugee crisis. It may have given flexibility to the EU and its member states, and it could also have eased the lives of the people who were displaced or who were in mobility.

But instead of that, although the Temporary Protection Directive is in the EU's toolbox, the EU preferred to have this 10-point action plan [8] in 2015 and then the European Agenda on Migration [9] in the same year to create solidarity between the EU countries to respond to 2015.

What could be the reasons? We can just hypothesize that. But the first point can be that the EU is always avoiding creating this pull factor. And there was a belief that if Temporary Protection was activated, it might encourage many migrants in the neighboring countries to migrate to the EU because there would be a legal basis, there would be access to rights, there would be access to protection. And the main hypothesis can be that the EU avoided creating this pull factor.

And also, we should underline that in 2015 the mass influx had a very mixed composition. It is not like the Ukrainian crisis, where one aggressor invaded the country and then displacement happened.

In 2015, it was mixed. Yes, there were people who needed immediate protection and they deserved refugee status, like Syrians and Afghans or Ethiopians, but also there were many people from other countries who joined this mass influx and claimed asylum as well. I mean, it doesn't undermine the fact that yes, there were people there in need of protection, but at the same time, this mixed composition was a question mark.

Plus, many of these people who needed protection at that time were already provided some kind of protection in the neighboring countries of the conflict. Like, many Syrians were already in Turkey or Jordan or Lebanon, or Afghans in Iran, and they had access to protection — not fully, but some kind of protection — which, you know, differentiated them from the immediate need of protection.

And lastly, may I also underline that I'm a scholar of political science and there were different stakes or perspectives about the Ukrainian crisis.

It was very close to Europe and there was this risk that the war or the threat could spread to other countries, and the EU countries felt more responsibility towards Ukraine in general and also towards the Ukrainian refugees to immediately respond.

But I’m assuming that this 2015 crisis taught something to the EU about how to respond to such mass influxes, because in 2015 there was such a huge problem about responsibility and burden sharing between the EU countries. This redistribution of the migrants didn't work out. Some countries had a huge burden, like Germany had almost a million refugees from that time,

while other countries did not really shoulder, let's say, the burden or responsibility. But this made the EU think that they should fairly distribute the responsibility, which Temporary Protection at least gives — this right that people can move wherever they want and then ask for status in this country. And I think there’s also this learning component, maybe small, maybe less important than the geopolitics, less important than the mixed flows, but still there is this component here.

But at the end of the day, I believe these different responses in both cases raised serious questions about the EU and its humanitarian side. Also, don't forget that when the Ukrainian crisis happened, the Taliban took over in Afghanistan.

People also were fleeing, but the response to Afghan refugees and Ukrainian refugees, both in the EU and also beyond the EU — I mean also Canada and the US, who provided protection to the Ukrainians — they didn’t show the same flexibility to the Afghans. And this raised questions about, okay, who deserves protection, whether race or religion plays a role, and differentiated humanitarianism.

These all raised questions about, you know, these different treatments within even the same period with Afghans and Ukrainians.

Asia Tsisar: Can you briefly describe what happens to a person who comes to the EU and applies for refugee status? What’s their everyday life like? Where do they live? What is permitted for them? What is not?

Zeynep Şahin Mencütek: Yeah, as far as I know, I can give an example from Germany, because this really depends on the country, which rights they are giving and also which services they are giving.

In Germany, for instance, if someone applies for asylum, they are put into shelters. They are given a room, an individual or shared room, and they can stay there and go out whenever they want. And they need to record — I mean, sign in — every week, I don't know the exact frequency.

They have pocket money for daily expenses. I guess it is something around 300 to 400, but I'm not sure because there was this discussion that instead of the money, they would be given shopping cards, and probably this is done. I don't know. They don't have a right to work, and they also get some small language courses and social services within the camp.

After their case is accepted — which often takes at least, I heard, one year, but I also heard three to four years as well, because even if it is rejected, asylum seekers have a right to appeal in court. And then again, another year or six months, and then one more appeal, and this goes like that.

Also, asylum seekers cannot change their city. They have to stay in the camp and in the city they were first assigned.

But in other countries like the Netherlands or Sweden, they are not given that right of shelter, also this cash money. For instance, in the Netherlands, there is no pocket money.

After their status is accepted as a refugee, they have a right to change and rent an apartment up to a certain price, which the municipality covers. And meanwhile, this person has a right to go to language courses and diploma recognition and has a right to family unification.

If it is a married man, if the kids are there — but the right of family unification changes according to the status. If it is subsidiary protection and not full refugee status, the person has no right to get his family or her family. And for instance, for Syrians, family unification is stopped. I mean, they cannot bring their families anymore. Also for Afghans, it is the same.

And yeah, I think the language and integration course is one to one and a half or two years. Meanwhile, they can look for a job. And if they have a contract after all this, they are able to work. I guess also they are getting some training in the fields they want to work, which the state is covering.

Asia Tsisar: When the Temporary Protection Directive was activated for Ukrainians, there was a discussion about this status being a privilege. So, I wanted to ask you, with all of your knowledge and critical approach, would you call Temporary Protection a privilege?

Zeynep Şahin Mencütek: Temporary Protection itself is not a privilege. It has advantages, to be honest, you know, we should really acknowledge — it has many advantages because it has very flexible eligibility criteria compared to refugee status, and it has a broad personal scope. And also, it has some harmonization with other protection standards like access to education for minors or access to some kind of social welfare, but also employment — it has some advantages.

Whether it is a privilege or not, I'm not sure, but from the eyes of other refugees, for instance, in Germany, I know Syrians or Afghans consider that Ukrainians are treated privilegedly in the general system because of this employment issue, and also because they face less bureaucratic hurdles compared to other refugee groups.

Also, there is not that much negative public discourse about Ukrainians. I think it is one of the main reasons because often Afghan or Syrian or other refugees are seen as a potential threat and also as a potential threat to cultural and social norms in Europe.

This is very explicit in social media, explicit in public discourse or political discourse, like the AfD [10] or other far-right. But there's not that much scapegoating of Ukrainians.

But I'm not sure that, let's say, if one refugee is really aware of these different statuses. And then the last thing, at least in Germany, when the Ukrainian influx happened, specifically in the language courses, the Syrians and Afghans were told that right now there’s a need for space for the Ukrainians.

And they were sidelined from some of the free services with the argument that Ukrainians need these services more than them. The combination of all of these creates the sense of privilege from the eyes of other refugees.

But just one last thing is that in other countries, for instance in Turkey, there are Syrians and Afghan refugees, but Afghans think that Syrians are treated privilegedly.

Actually, yes, because Syrians have Temporary Protection, Afghans don’t have Temporary Protection. And also, they have very limited access to the normal asylum procedures. Because of that, Afghans don’t have that much access to health and hospitals. In Turkey, this is free for Syrians. And these differences make the Afghans think that Syrians are privileged.

And the same in, for instance, in Jordan between the Syrians versus Ethiopian refugee groups. And there is always this comparison and the consideration that one group is more privileged than the other.

There is a fact inside because the countries select which services they will give to which group. This is differentiated treatment or differentiated integration. For instance, the Syrians in Turkey — some of them are given this right to citizenship, while for Afghans it is just impossible.

Asia Tsisar: Okay, I then will ask you to clear this thing for me. Temporary Protection, as they say, means permanent insecurity. While after a certain person is granted refugee status, basically this person is secure.

But just for the record, do you know how many people apply for refugee status and how many are successful and how many of them get rejected?

Zeynep Şahin Mencütek: I don't, to be honest, because it also differs from year to year, country to country. And also, it doesn't mean that the person applied for refugee status in 2015 and then got it in 2016. There are also these backlogs in the systems — you know, refugee status is taking years, like three to four years in Europe, and also in Turkey, for instance, it sometimes takes 10 years for Afghans to get one status.

This is why we always say this is a very precarious waiting, also for those who are in Temporary Protection. For Temporary Protection, it’s worse because there is a risk that it can be revoked.

But also it depends on the nationality of the person. For instance, for a long time, for Syrians and Afghans, their asylum applications were accepted. But right now, in many countries, Syrians’ asylum applications were suspended because of the “safe country.”

And from Afghanistan, often the women’s and the children’s applications tend to be accepted, while the male applications are almost immediately rejected.

But from our experience with the Syrians, we know that those who came in 2015 and 2016 — some of them started to receive citizenship. This is also the advantage of Refugee status compared to Temporary Protection.

Maybe the numbers are not that high, but after they are accepted as official refugees and get permanent residence, they need to wait, I guess, for five years or seven, because these years are also changing. And then they apply for citizenship.

And I know some colleagues, they already got citizenship of Germany or other countries. While for those under Temporary Protection or subsidiary protection, it is impossible. I mean, they cannot apply because their duration is not accepted as a normal permanent residency. Maybe some things will change later on, but currently this pathway to naturalization or citizenship — or let's say, full-scale integration — is not possible for Temporary Protection.

Asia Tsisar: In my conversation with Ruslana, we came to a very interesting observation that in the current situation, Ukrainian displaced people are treated more as labor migrants than victims of the war.

What is the relation between cheap labor migration and Temporary Protection status? Is it the same, for example, in Turkey or in other countries where this system was activated?

Zeynep Şahin Mencütek: It is slightly different in other countries. In the nature of the Temporary Protection Directive, access to employment is not that much clearer. But what the EU did for the Ukrainians is that it immediately mobilized this access to employment, right? It’s also very unexpected.

Even for refugee status — even those Syrians or Afghans or other refugees in European countries — they are not able to work. They don’t have access to employment for a long time. It’s quite different for Ukrainians. They have immediate access to the labor market.

This has some advantages because my interviews with refugees always show that they want to work. I mean, if you put barriers on them to working, and also if you put a lot of barriers about language learning prior to working, this really makes life very difficult for them, but also brings some positive aspects because they rely on social assistance. This is also giving some minimal things. It has advantages and disadvantages, let’s say.

But when it comes to the non-EU countries, other refugees, even if there is a Temporary Protection status, they are not legally permitted to work. I mean, by law. In Turkey, after the Temporary Protection Directive in 2014, I believe in 2016, Turkey introduced another legislation just for the Syrians saying that Syrians can officially work. But it is not due to Temporary Protection; it was another legislation.

However, we know that many refugees in these countries are informally working and they are hugely contributing to the cheap labor market. Also, in some countries, they are the main drivers of sectors like textile, agriculture, construction. And these countries really benefit from this labor market force.

And it was also one of my notes that Temporary Protection status eases this informality in working. Because it brings legal uncertainty. And also the refugees don’t have that many rights or say, but at the same time, they don’t have any social benefits like retirement pensions.

And also, if there is any workplace incident — which is not rare, by the way — they don’t have such protection because they are both informally working, but also their legal status is a little shaky. You are not a citizen and you are not a permanent migrant, so you cannot make a claim. And I think, for instance, right now, the Turkish example shows that this refugee precarity is benefiting business and some sectors, unfortunately.

Asia Tsisar: Who would you say is the main benefitter of both the system of Refugee Protection and Temporary Protection? Is it designed to help people or is it more designed to secure the state?

Zeynep Şahin Mencütek: From my perspective, it is more to secure the state interest. Why I tell that — also, you know, not only in the EU context, I know it for the other contexts like Lebanon, Turkey, Iran. Temporary Protection gives the states room for maneuver because it is temporary. From its definition, it is temporary.

And also, it depends on the decision of the authority in that country. For instance, in the Turkish return directive, the president can decide whether the protection should be revoked or not. Or in other countries, the parliament or ministries or whoever can decide whether it should be extended or it should be revoked.

And also, you know that for stopping the protection, it is enough to deem one country as a safe country. And at some point, Afghanistan was also deemed as a safe country of origin.

And the return operations happened from Germany and other EU countries to Afghanistan in 2015–16 because it was deemed as safe. But in a couple of years, it again collapsed.

But also, safe doesn't mean that the country is conducive to provide protection to these people. But it is a political decision at the end of the day — to continue the protection status or not. It's a political decision giving maneuver to the country.

Plus, Temporary Protection gives countries the ability to select which groups they will give this status to. There are cases, for instance, from the Middle East that some groups like Iraqis were not given Temporary Protection while at the same time Syrians were given. The country can select who to give protection to. It's also a little similar in the EU case. The EU decided to give protection to Ukrainians, okay, for very fair reasons, but there's also this selectiveness.

Plus, the last thing is capacity. Temporary Protection saves a lot of money and also capacity for the countries of destination because the proceedings happen in a group-based recognition. And also, it is the reason for many non-EU countries — they don't have real capacity to process all of these demands or legal statuses.

Lastly, this is also maybe the one disadvantage of Temporary Protection: it is not giving a real right to naturalization or full naturalization of the refugees.

In general, yes, it is benefiting the states, but also we should not exaggerate — it’s also really helping to the protection of the displaced people immediately and has many advantages.

Asia Tsisar: Also, in the first episode of this podcast [11], we discussed how solidarity is linked to empathy and how, when it comes to structuring our political actions, empathy may not be the most solid ground because it is easier for people to empathize with someone who looks like them. And the closer someone is to you, the more you are able to project onto and recognize yourself in what this person is going through.

Zeynep Şahin Mencütek: Yeah, I agree with this observation. Actually, one of the things I noted about the differentiation between the EU's response to Ukrainians and the other crises is this empathy.

Because also remember the first days of the Ukrainian crisis, there was huge empathy and solidarity at the very societal and local level in countries like Poland and others. It is how the person looks like you, but also there is this cultural and historical background.

You have similarity or kinship, religion, culture, and similar background. This is creating this more empathic environment. Also, the less threat perception.

I should pay attention that Ukrainians are not seen as a threat to the culture of Europe, unlike other refugee groups that are seen as a threat to the composition or demography of Europe.

But it is not only specific to Europe. This empathy part we also see in other countries, like, for instance, Turkey or Lebanon and Jordan. Although Jordan and Lebanon are very small countries —

specifically Lebanon, it’s only 5 million. When the Syrian influx happened, they received 1 million. One million Syrians for a country with a 5 million population.

Yes, there were some border issues, but at the same time, there were very close historical and socio-cultural kinship relations between these two communities.

Similar happened in Turkey, in the border regions, and in Jordan. But here it is called “cultural affinity” in the literature. I mean, they have a cultural affinity with the country. Syrians also welcomed many refugees from Palestine in the last decades.

I mean, there is always this consideration that, okay, if something happens here, we are also going to be displaced and will go to the closest place, right? I mean, that type of empathy.

But I should add that this empathy is short-lived empathy. It cannot ensure protection for a long time. It also happens with many Syrian neighboring countries or Afghan neighboring countries. Empathy lasts for a couple of years and mobilizes the resources, but there is this critical juncture, which I call this in my book about refugee governance [12]. After three to sometimes four years, there is this critical juncture. If there are economic problems or other social problems, the refugees are the first groups who are scapegoated.

I mean, this empathy is not always linearly upward, but it often goes down and then changes, even turning to hatred, because then the countries are saying, okay, they are different. And, you know, the “we versus they,” even if there is an actual empathy or affinity.

Asia Tsisar: This is exactly what's happening now in countries like Poland or Hungary, where the initial extreme level of solidarity is now turning into a narrative of threat. And politicians often use Ukrainians as scapegoats for any possible problem. And it's a really disturbing thing to observe.

But also, probably the reason why I initiated the whole discussion about the protection was to unwrap a bit the imaginaries of solidarity between people coming from different backgrounds.

And I'm curious, what are your observations?

Zeynep Şahin Mencütek: First of all, it is the states' responsibility to protect people. I will not just call this solidarity, but I think we should bring in this responsibility element because the states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens, but also other people who are not able to access protection.

We should not wait for society to show solidarity. It should be more institutionalized. I mean, the Ukrainian crisis showed that yes, there's a huge capacity of civil society, a huge capacity of local communities to show solidarity, to show support, assistance. And also all the other countries, as I said, like Bangladesh, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon — their publics showed solidarity.

But we shouldn't forget that often there's this resource issue. I mean, the resources are limited. When the resources become more shared, the community goes back to their own self-centric mechanisms. The lack of resources or the limitations in resources is one factor preventing solidarity.

I also believe that political discourse is preventing solidarity if there is an anti-migrant, anti-refugee stance very widespread in the politicians' language or in social media right now, as we observe. This is also preventing solidarity at some point.

Also, people and societies want to see certainty, including the refugees themselves. I think this lack of certainty is something preventing solidarity,

because the question is: how long? How long are we going to take care of Ukrainians? How long are we going to take care of Afghans? And this is also the little relevant fact that often these displacements are protracted. They are not solved in a few years. They last for decades and decades. And Afghans right now are 40 years. Syrians — more than 10 years. And the Ethiopian, Sudanese, and Venezuela crises — all of them are getting protracted, making solidarity, you know, difficult to be sustainable. Because of that, there should be durable solutions.

And the last thing — yeah, it came to my mind, but I forgot — solidarity is prevented if it is not shared. I mean, shared in a way that, you know, if it's only one community or one state showing solidarity and the others don't do anything, if the burden is not shared equally and fairly. And this is creating, you know, a negative atmosphere: okay, whether it should be only always Germany taking this responsibility, or Turkey with 3 million refugees, or Lebanon with 1 million. I mean, that lack of sharing the burden is also preventing solidarity in the long run. Maybe I can summarize like that.

Asia Tsisar: But what about the solidarity among displaced communities? So, for example, there was an idea at the beginning of the full-scale invasion that such a mass situation of displacement could contribute to positive changes in the EU law. Such a scale of displacement could potentially help other communities who are facing the same. We now know that it didn't happen.

You said, and it was a very interesting thought, if I understand you right, that the mass migration in 2015 and the years after led to the decision to activate Temporary Protection for Ukrainians, because it was so hard to manage — and sorry for this simple word, but it was such a mess — that the EU decided it is easier to enable a Temporary Protection Directive.

But still, we see this disproportion in resources that prevents people from, let's say, Afghanistan, Syria, Ukraine, Palestine, from shaping a solidarity movement that can critically contribute to the perception of displacement. Am I too idealistic?

Zeynep Şahin Mencütek: Yeah, unfortunately, yes. But just one correction. I said that lessons learned from 2015 can have some impact on the Temporary Protection activation, but it is not a direct causality. We don't know. It may have some impact along with other things, like probably the other things like geopolitics and the closeness of Ukraine and other things are more important.

But at least I wish — I wish — that there is some political learning. We are also discussing in the articles that there are always the same mistakes done, and then why the organizations didn't learn from their previous mistakes to improve.

As we see some improvements in the Ukrainian case, I wish there may be some element of political learning and institutional learning from the mistakes done in 2015. But as I said, I don't have any direct evidence to say that, yes, it is one of the argumentations, because we were not in these meeting rooms.

If we come to your other point — yes, actually, there was this optimism that the full-scale invasion and also EU's response — that okay, maybe it will further institutionalize this Temporary Protection and there will be more empathy. But unfortunately, it wasn't the case, as you said, not only in the EU, but also globally.

Unfortunately, the current developments on a global scale — and we shouldn't also underestimate the US role and the changes in governments in many countries — show a very strong trend toward an anti-immigration discourse in many countries, also non-EU countries globally.

This is also the case in India. Although India, for instance, was very tolerant to the Rohingya refugees for a long time, in the last two years, they want to deport Rohingyas, although numbers are very small. I mean, because these political discourses are very nationalist and are often built onto the anti-immigration, specifically anti-refugee.

And same in South Africa, for instance. South Africa has a number of irregular migrants. And so there is one party, the Dudulu movement [13], like in Turkey [14], established to talk about anti-immigration, like AfD in Germany.

And also the latest votes in Europe show that, yes, these anti-immigration discourses get the attention of the public, and the public is voting for such parties. Not elected them, but still a rise in the votes. And countries even like Germany right now are restricting their border controls and restricting the rights to family unification.

Same in Sweden. Government is restricting and giving more attention to the deportation of those rejected asylum seekers. We have this survey and we see that publics are supporting the deportation of irregular migrants.

And these are making the global regime, global international order, and the UN also shrinking due to this US cut of the aid. US cuts support to the UN and there are these questions about what will happen to UNHCR [15] and IOM [16] .

Unfortunately, the direction is not towards more protection, but towards more restriction when it comes to refugee or asylum seeking or migration in general.

I'm sorry. I don't want to be... I hope... Yeah. Tthere are still yet alternative voices — should I add that — and there is some contestation and very local level solidarity, but we don't see that there is scaling up of these initiatives at a very global level or political level, because politics are a little overwhelming to the humanitarian concerns.